The dynamics of other-deception and self-deception

Dr. Anna Wehofsits (University of Munich)

09.06.2020 – 16.00 – 17.00 – (lecture, followed by an extended discussion)

Abstract:
If one understands self-deception in analogy to other-deception, the phenomenon appears paradoxical. Today most authors therefore argue that we should conceptually separate self-deception from other-deception. I share this view. However, it is usually overlooked that the practice of self-deception bears an interesting relationship to other-deception, which also raises conceptual and normative questions. Very often, self-deception affects not only the beliefs and behavior of the self-deceiving person, but also the beliefs and behavior of others, who may become (involuntary) accomplices in self-deception. As it seems, other-deception can support self-deception (and vice versa). It is, however, very difficult to describe this dynamic without contradictions. In my talk, I discuss the problems associated with different readings of the mutual support of self-deception and other-deception. I will show that proposals that help to resolve the tensions within the notion of self-deception do not also resolve the tensions that arise between self-deception and other-deception when trying to describe how they support each other.

What can we learn
about mineness
from dépersonnalisation?

Alexandre Billon (Department of Philosophy, University of Lille)

05.05.2020 – 16.00 – 17.00 – (lecture, followed by an extended discussion)

Online Lecture via zoom
Login information:

https://zoom.us/j/464004598?pwd=S2lWYytZTFNySWxPbjFKbGxHQlEwQT09

Meeting ID: 464 004 598

Password: 004051

Abstract:

Patients suffering from depersonalization complain of feeling detached from their body, their mental states, and actions or even from themselves. In this paper, I argue that depersonalization consists in the lack of a phenomenal feature that marks my experiences as mine, which is usually called “mineness”, and that the study of depersonalization constitutes a neglected yet incomparable probe to assess empirically the scope, role, and even the nature of mineness.

Import Theory:
The Social Making of Consciousness

Wolfgang Prinz (Department of Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences)

23.06.2020 – 16.00 – 17.00 – (lecture, followed by an extended discussion)

Online Lecture via zoom
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Password: 000521

Abstract:
This talk outlines what I call an import theory of selfhood and consciousness. Import theory raises three major claims: (i) conscious awareness builds on self-representation; (ii) selfhood is a social, not a natural kind; (iii) selfhood is imported from others to self. While export theories offer a number of mechanisms to account for the putative transition from self to others, import theories have so far not much to offer for the putative transition in the reverse direction. A framework is outlined to close this gap. Key to the framework is the notion of action matching. This term addresses dyadic interactions for perception/action matching, that is, matching perception of foreign action to production of own action, and vice versa. The framework specifies both representational resources and social practices on which self-import through action matching is claimed to rely. A final commentary compares export and import theories in terms of explanatory power, claiming that import theories can explain key features of consciousness that export theories can only invoke.

Wie unsere Gedanken unsere Wahrnehmung beeinflussen

Bei dieser Studie brauchten die Testpersonen viel Mut, etwas ganz Neues auszuprobieren. Zu wissenschaftlichen Zwecken ließen sie sich hypnotisieren.

Ausgangspunkt für die Untersuchungen war eine Frage von Prof. Dr. Albert Newen. Der Philosoph und Leiter des „Center for Mind and Cognition“ an der RUB wollte wissen, ob alle Menschen, soweit sie funktionierende Sinne und ein gesundes Hirn haben, stets dasselbe wahrnehmen. Schaut man beispielsweise auf ein geschlossenes Laptop, so ist klar, dass sich das Wahrnehmungsurteil abhängig vom Wissen des Betrachters verändern kann: Während der eine es als graue Alubox beschreibt, erkennt der andere darin ein Laptop. Aber dennoch scheint es so, dass wir alle dasselbe sehen. Ob das wirklich so ist oder ob der Wahrnehmungseindruck sogar vom Hintergrundwissen verändert werden kann, soll von einem interdisziplinären Team bestehend aus Philosophen, Medizinern, Biologen, Neurowissenschaftlern sowie einem Hypnotiseur geklärt werden.

Den vollständigen Artikel finden Sie unter: https://news.rub.de/wissenschaft/2020-03-31-hirnforschung-wie-unsere-gedanken-unsere-wahrnehmung-beeinflussen

Zooming in and out on one’s life: Autobiographical representations at multiple time scales

Arnaud D’Argembeau (Department of Psychology, University of Liège)

28.04.2020 – 16.00 – 17.00 – (lecture, followed by an extended discussion)

Online Lecture via zoom
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ZOOM:
https://zoom.us/j/388855144?pwd=a3RsblV4bjYwbXNEUlZacGVBQm9rdz09

Meeting ID: 388 855 144 Password: 012872

Abstract:
The ability to decouple from the present to explore other times –
mental time travel – is a central feature of the human mind. Research
in cognitive psychology and neuroscience has shown that
personal experiences in the past and future are represented at
multiple timescales and levels of resolution, from broad lifetime
periods that span years to short-time slices of experience that
span seconds.
In this talk, I will propose a theoretical framework for understanding
mental time travel as the capacity to flexibly navigate hierarchical
layers of autobiographical representations. On this view,
past and future thoughts rely on two main systems – event simulation
and autobiographical knowledge – that allow us to represent
experiential contents that are decoupled from sensory input
and to place these on a personal timeline scaffolded from conceptual
knowledge of the content and structure of our life.

Training Perception and Action to Do the Right Thing

Prof. Robert Goldstone (Indiana University Bloomington, USA)
16.03.2020 – 14.00 – (lecture, followed by an extended discussion)
RUB, GA 04/187 (Mercatorraum)

Abstract:

By one account, formal thought in mathematics and science requires developing deep construals that run counter to perception.  This approach draws an opposition between superficial perception and principled understanding.  In this talk, I advocate the converse strategy of grounding scientific and mathematical reasoning in perception and action.   Relatively sophisticated reasoning is typically achieved not by ignoring perception, but rather by adapting perception and action routines so as to conform with and support formally sanctioned responses.   Perception and action are more sophisticated than usually thought, particularly because they can be adapted to do the (cognitive) Right Thing.

The first case study for this thesis concerns arithmetic and algebraic reasoning, where we find that mathematical proficiency involves executing spatially explicit transformations to notational elements.  People learn to attend mathematical operations in the order in which they should be executed, and the extent to which students employ their perceptual attention in this manner is positively correlated with their mathematical experience.  People also produce mathematical notations that they are good at reading.  Based on observations like these, we have begun to design, implement, and assess virtual, interactive sandboxes for students to explore algebra.

The second case study involves students learning about science by exploring simulations.   We have developed a computational model of the process by which human learners discover patterns in natural phenomena.  Our approach to modeling how people learn about a system by interacting with it follows three core design principles: 1) perceptual grounding, 2) experimental intervention, and 3) cognitively plausible heuristics for determining relations between simulation elements.  In contrast to the majority of existing models of scientific discovery in which inputs are presented as symbolic, often numerically quantified, structured representations, our model takes as input perceptually grounded, spatio-temporal movies of simulated natural phenomena.