The Center for Mind & Cognition (CMC) is an interdisciplinary platform at the Ruhr-University Bochum. The objective of the Center for Mind & Cognition is to investigate the enigmatic and at the same time fascinating nature of the mind and its constitutive cognitive processes by tapping the full potential of interdisciplinary collaborations. A better understanding of cognition from multiple perspectives will contribute to the development of an empirically anchored integrative understanding of the architecture of mind and cognition. The special strategy of CMC is to investigate the same normal or pathological behavior from different perspectives including evolutionary, ontogenetic, mechanistic, computational, functional, social and especially philosophical explanations. Read More
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Arnaud D’Argembeau (Department of Psychology, University of Liège)
28.04.2020 – 16.00 – 17.00 – (lecture, followed by an extended discussion)
Online Lecture via zoom
Meeting ID: 388 855 144 Password: 012872
The ability to decouple from the present to explore other times –
mental time travel – is a central feature of the human mind. Research
in cognitive psychology and neuroscience has shown that
personal experiences in the past and future are represented at
multiple timescales and levels of resolution, from broad lifetime
periods that span years to short-time slices of experience that
In this talk, I will propose a theoretical framework for understanding
mental time travel as the capacity to flexibly navigate hierarchical
layers of autobiographical representations. On this view,
past and future thoughts rely on two main systems – event simulation
and autobiographical knowledge – that allow us to represent
experiential contents that are decoupled from sensory input
and to place these on a personal timeline scaffolded from conceptual
knowledge of the content and structure of our life.
Bei dieser Studie brauchten die Testpersonen viel Mut, etwas ganz Neues auszuprobieren. Zu wissenschaftlichen Zwecken ließen sie sich hypnotisieren.
Ausgangspunkt für die Untersuchungen war eine Frage von Prof. Dr. Albert Newen. Der Philosoph und Leiter des „Center for Mind and Cognition“ an der RUB wollte wissen, ob alle Menschen, soweit sie funktionierende Sinne und ein gesundes Hirn haben, stets dasselbe wahrnehmen. Schaut man beispielsweise auf ein geschlossenes Laptop, so ist klar, dass sich das Wahrnehmungsurteil abhängig vom Wissen des Betrachters verändern kann: Während der eine es als graue Alubox beschreibt, erkennt der andere darin ein Laptop. Aber dennoch scheint es so, dass wir alle dasselbe sehen. Ob das wirklich so ist oder ob der Wahrnehmungseindruck sogar vom Hintergrundwissen verändert werden kann, soll von einem interdisziplinären Team bestehend aus Philosophen, Medizinern, Biologen, Neurowissenschaftlern sowie einem Hypnotiseur geklärt werden.
Den vollständigen Artikel finden Sie unter: https://news.rub.de/wissenschaft/2020-03-31-hirnforschung-wie-unsere-gedanken-unsere-wahrnehmung-beeinflussen
Dr. Anna Wehofsits (University of Munich)
09.06.2020 – 16.00 – 17.00 – (lecture, followed by an extended discussion)
Online Lecture via zoom
Meeting-ID: 983 1043 7212 Passwort: 189451
If one understands self-deception in analogy to other-deception, the phenomenon appears paradoxical. Today most authors therefore argue that we should conceptually separate self-deception from other-deception. I share this view. However, it is usually overlooked that the practice of self-deception bears an interesting relationship to other-deception, which also raises conceptual and normative questions. Very often, self-deception affects not only the beliefs and behavior of the self-deceiving person, but also the beliefs and behavior of others, who may become (involuntary) accomplices in self-deception. As it seems, other-deception can support self-deception (and vice versa). It is, however, very difficult to describe this dynamic without contradictions. In my talk, I discuss the problems associated with different readings of the mutual support of self-deception and other-deception. I will show that proposals that help to resolve the tensions within the notion of self-deception do not also resolve the tensions that arise between self-deception and other-deception when trying to describe how they support each other.
The Social Making of Consciousness
23.06.2020 – 16.00 – 17.00 – (lecture, followed by an extended discussion)
Online Lecture via zoom
Meeting ID: 611 472 821
This talk outlines what I call an import theory of selfhood and consciousness. Import theory raises three major claims: (i) conscious awareness builds on self-representation; (ii) selfhood is a social, not a natural kind; (iii) selfhood is imported from others to self. While export theories offer a number of mechanisms to account for the putative transition from self to others, import theories have so far not much to offer for the putative transition in the reverse direction. A framework is outlined to close this gap. Key to the framework is the notion of action matching. This term addresses dyadic interactions for perception/action matching, that is, matching perception of foreign action to production of own action, and vice versa. The framework specifies both representational resources and social practices on which self-import through action matching is claimed to rely. A final commentary compares export and import theories in terms of explanatory power, claiming that import theories can explain key features of consciousness that export theories can only invoke.
*please note that the details on the poster are not correct. Check the text below for current information
The event will be held using the Zoom platform over four consecutive weeks.
We would like to ask for registration before the event at the following email address:
CET (i.e. Berlin\Amsterdam timezone)
15:15 – 16:15 Alexander Miller Tate (KCL)
Title: Explaining agential pathology in clinical depression
16:15 – 17:15 Roy Dings (RUB)
Title: Meaningful affordances
17:15 – 18:15 Keynote: Sanneke de Haan (Tilburg)
Title: Is it me or my disorder? Relational authenticity in psychiatry
15:15 – 16:15 Irena Dajić (Vienna)
Title: The Efficacy of Delusional Belief
16:15 – 17:15 Francesco Marchi (RUB)
Title: Spinozan Self-deception
15:15 – 16:15 Michelle Liu (Hertfordshire)
Title: The Concept of Pain
16:15 – 17:15 Guido Robin Löhr (RUB)
15:15 – 16:15 Sofiia Rappe (LMU)
Title: Thinking about Thought (and Predictive Processing)
16:15 – 17:15 Nina Poth (RUB)
Title: Predictive Processing as a unifying theory. In what sense?
17:15 – 18:15 Keynote: Rob Rupert(Boulder)
Title: Self-Knowledge as a Subpersonal Phenomenon
What can we learn
Alexandre Billon (Department of Philosophy, University of Lille)
05.05.2020 – 16.00 – 17.00 – (lecture, followed by an extended discussion)
Online Lecture via zoom
Meeting ID: 464 004 598
Patients suffering from depersonalization complain of feeling detached from their body, their mental states, and actions or even from themselves. In this paper, I argue that depersonalization consists in the lack of a phenomenal feature that marks my experiences as mine, which is usually called “mineness”, and that the study of depersonalization constitutes a neglected yet incomparable probe to assess empirically the scope, role, and even the nature of mineness.