Bei dieser Studie brauchten die Testpersonen viel Mut, etwas ganz Neues auszuprobieren. Zu wissenschaftlichen Zwecken ließen sie sich hypnotisieren.

Ausgangspunkt für die Untersuchungen war eine Frage von Prof. Dr. Albert Newen. Der Philosoph und Leiter des „Center for Mind and Cognition“ an der RUB wollte wissen, ob alle Menschen, soweit sie funktionierende Sinne und ein gesundes Hirn haben, stets dasselbe wahrnehmen. Schaut man beispielsweise auf ein geschlossenes Laptop, so ist klar, dass sich das Wahrnehmungsurteil abhängig vom Wissen des Betrachters verändern kann: Während der eine es als graue Alubox beschreibt, erkennt der andere darin ein Laptop. Aber dennoch scheint es so, dass wir alle dasselbe sehen. Ob das wirklich so ist oder ob der Wahrnehmungseindruck sogar vom Hintergrundwissen verändert werden kann, soll von einem interdisziplinären Team bestehend aus Philosophen, Medizinern, Biologen, Neurowissenschaftlern sowie einem Hypnotiseur geklärt werden.

Den vollständigen Artikel finden Sie unter: https://news.rub.de/wissenschaft/2020-03-31-hirnforschung-wie-unsere-gedanken-unsere-wahrnehmung-beeinflussen

Dr. Anna Wehofsits (University of Munich)

09.06.2020 – 16.00 – 17.00 – (lecture, followed by an extended discussion)

Abstract:
If one understands self-deception in analogy to other-deception, the phenomenon appears paradoxical. Today most authors therefore argue that we should conceptually separate self-deception from other-deception. I share this view. However, it is usually overlooked that the practice of self-deception bears an interesting relationship to other-deception, which also raises conceptual and normative questions. Very often, self-deception affects not only the beliefs and behavior of the self-deceiving person, but also the beliefs and behavior of others, who may become (involuntary) accomplices in self-deception. As it seems, other-deception can support self-deception (and vice versa). It is, however, very difficult to describe this dynamic without contradictions. In my talk, I discuss the problems associated with different readings of the mutual support of self-deception and other-deception. I will show that proposals that help to resolve the tensions within the notion of self-deception do not also resolve the tensions that arise between self-deception and other-deception when trying to describe how they support each other.

Import Theory:
The Social Making of Consciousness

Wolfgang Prinz (Department of Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences)

23.06.2020 – 16.00 – 17.00 – (lecture, followed by an extended discussion)

Online Lecture via zoom
Login information:

Password: 000521

Abstract:
This talk outlines what I call an import theory of selfhood and consciousness. Import theory raises three major claims: (i) conscious awareness builds on self-representation; (ii) selfhood is a social, not a natural kind; (iii) selfhood is imported from others to self. While export theories offer a number of mechanisms to account for the putative transition from self to others, import theories have so far not much to offer for the putative transition in the reverse direction. A framework is outlined to close this gap. Key to the framework is the notion of action matching. This term addresses dyadic interactions for perception/action matching, that is, matching perception of foreign action to production of own action, and vice versa. The framework specifies both representational resources and social practices on which self-import through action matching is claimed to rely. A final commentary compares export and import theories in terms of explanatory power, claiming that import theories can explain key features of consciousness that export theories can only invoke.

*please note that the details on the poster are not correct. Check the text below for current information

Platform and Registration

The event will be held using the Zoom platform over four consecutive weeks.

We would like to ask for registration before the event at the following email address:  

alfredo-vernazzani@daad-alumni.de 

Schedule

CET (i.e. Berlin\Amsterdam timezone)

12 JUNE

15:15 – 16:15   Alexander Miller Tate (KCL)

Title: Explaining agential pathology in clinical depression

16:15 – 17:15   Roy Dings (RUB)

Title: Meaningful affordances

17:15 – 18:15   Keynote: Sanneke de Haan (Tilburg)

Title: Is it me or my disorder? Relational authenticity in psychiatry

19 JUNE

15:15 – 16:15   Irena Dajić (Vienna)

Title: The Efficacy of Delusional Belief

16:15 – 17:15    Francesco Marchi (RUB)

 Title: Spinozan Self-deception

26 JUNE

15:15 – 16:15   Michelle Liu (Hertfordshire)

Title: The Concept of Pain

16:15 – 17:15    Guido Robin Löhr (RUB)

Title: TBA

3 JULY

15:15 – 16:15    Sofiia Rappe (LMU)

Title: Thinking about Thought (and Predictive Processing)

16:15 – 17:15   Nina Poth (RUB)

Title: Predictive Processing as a unifying theory. In what sense?

17:15 – 18:15    Keynote: Rob Rupert(Boulder)

Title: Self-Knowledge as a Subpersonal Phenomenon

What can we learn
about mineness
from dépersonnalisation?

Alexandre Billon (Department of Philosophy, University of Lille)

05.05.2020 – 16.00 – 17.00 – (lecture, followed by an extended discussion)

Online Lecture via zoom
Login information:

https://zoom.us/j/464004598?pwd=S2lWYytZTFNySWxPbjFKbGxHQlEwQT09

Meeting ID: 464 004 598

Password: 004051

Abstract:

Patients suffering from depersonalization complain of feeling detached from their body, their mental states, and actions or even from themselves. In this paper, I argue that depersonalization consists in the lack of a phenomenal feature that marks my experiences as mine, which is usually called “mineness”, and that the study of depersonalization constitutes a neglected yet incomparable probe to assess empirically the scope, role, and even the nature of mineness.