Bei dieser Studie brauchten die Testpersonen viel Mut, etwas ganz
Neues auszuprobieren. Zu wissenschaftlichen Zwecken ließen sie sich
hypnotisieren.
Ausgangspunkt für die Untersuchungen war eine Frage von Prof. Dr. Albert Newen. Der Philosoph und Leiter des „Center for Mind and Cognition“ an der RUB wollte wissen, ob alle Menschen, soweit sie funktionierende Sinne und ein gesundes Hirn haben, stets dasselbe wahrnehmen. Schaut man beispielsweise auf ein geschlossenes Laptop, so ist klar, dass sich das Wahrnehmungsurteil abhängig vom Wissen des Betrachters verändern kann: Während der eine es als graue Alubox beschreibt, erkennt der andere darin ein Laptop. Aber dennoch scheint es so, dass wir alle dasselbe sehen. Ob das wirklich so ist oder ob der Wahrnehmungseindruck sogar vom Hintergrundwissen verändert werden kann, soll von einem interdisziplinären Team bestehend aus Philosophen, Medizinern, Biologen, Neurowissenschaftlern sowie einem Hypnotiseur geklärt werden.
Den vollständigen Artikel finden Sie unter: https://news.rub.de/wissenschaft/2020-03-31-hirnforschung-wie-unsere-gedanken-unsere-wahrnehmung-beeinflussen
Abstract:
The ability to decouple from the present to explore other times –
mental time travel – is a central feature of the human mind. Research
in cognitive psychology and neuroscience has shown that
personal experiences in the past and future are represented at
multiple timescales and levels of resolution, from broad lifetime
periods that span years to short-time slices of experience that
span seconds.
In this talk, I will propose a theoretical framework for understanding
mental time travel as the capacity to flexibly navigate hierarchical
layers of autobiographical representations. On this view,
past and future thoughts rely on two main systems – event simulation
and autobiographical knowledge – that allow us to represent
experiential contents that are decoupled from sensory input
and to place these on a personal timeline scaffolded from conceptual
knowledge of the content and structure of our life.
Prof. Robert Goldstone (Indiana University Bloomington, USA) 16.03.2020 – 14.00 – (lecture, followed by an extended discussion) RUB, GA 04/187 (Mercatorraum)
Abstract:
By one account,
formal thought in mathematics and science requires developing deep construals
that run counter to perception. This approach draws an opposition between
superficial perception and principled understanding. In this talk,
I advocate the converse strategy of grounding scientific and mathematical
reasoning in perception and action. Relatively sophisticated
reasoning is typically achieved not by ignoring perception, but rather by
adapting perception and action routines so as to conform with and support
formally sanctioned responses. Perception and action are more
sophisticated than usually thought, particularly because they can be adapted to
do the (cognitive) Right Thing.
The first case
study for this thesis concerns arithmetic and algebraic reasoning, where we
find that mathematical proficiency involves executing spatially explicit
transformations to notational elements. People learn to attend mathematical
operations in the order in which they should be executed, and the extent to
which students employ their perceptual attention in this manner is positively
correlated with their mathematical experience. People also produce
mathematical notations that they are good at reading. Based on
observations like these, we have begun to design, implement, and assess
virtual, interactive sandboxes for students to explore algebra.
The second case
study involves students learning about science by exploring
simulations. We have developed a computational model of the process
by which human learners discover patterns in natural phenomena. Our
approach to modeling how people learn about a system by interacting with it
follows three core design principles: 1) perceptual grounding, 2) experimental
intervention, and 3) cognitively plausible heuristics for determining relations
between simulation elements. In contrast to the majority of existing
models of scientific discovery in which inputs are presented as symbolic, often
numerically quantified, structured representations, our model takes as input
perceptually grounded, spatio-temporal movies of simulated natural phenomena.
We have all been told to take another person’s perspective at times. Common sense holds that this makes a difference to our understanding of others. But in recent years, philosophers such as Peter Goldie have argued that it is impossible to replicate another’s experience by pretending to be them in their situation. And the psychological evidence is not encouraging. Apparently, people really are not able to understand each other very well. I argue that the problem, though serious, is overblown. Part of the problem is that people have not taken seriously enough the idea of perspectives and how changing them changes our attitudes towards the objects in someone’s environment. I explain what perspective taking really is, what it does, and how it aids interpersonal understanding.
