Ching Keng (National Taiwan University)
Ching Keng

Abstract: This talk investigates whether episodic memory necessarily involves a sense of self, examined from a Buddhist perspective. As is well known, the Buddhist tradition strongly denies the existence of a constant and invariable self. Nevertheless, it equally insists that the sense of self not only exists but is deeply ingrained and exceedingly difficult to eradicate. Since no real self exists, such a sense of self must be understood as a construct arising from more fundamental elements. I take this constructivist view of the self to be characteristic of the Buddhist understanding of the sense of self. Building on the distinction between the narrative self and the minimal self, I will argue that a sense of minimal self is always embedded in episodic memory. I further propose that this minimal sense of self arises from coherent perceptual experiences organized from a particular perspective. The talk concludes with a few directions for future inquiry.