Abstract: Does moral ignorance due to forgetting exculpate wrongdoing? Could an agent be blamelessly ignorant of, say, the fact that one ought to be tolerant of differences; or would such an ignorance always imply a lack of good will? I argue that the debate about the exculpation of forgetting-based moral ignorance suffers from two defects. First, the debate does not first consider the rules for which morally relevant memory behaviors we ought to perform and avoid. Second, the debate lacks a proper understanding of the processes by which people forget the difference between right and wrong. When we examine the processes by which people remember or forget the correct moral theory or acquire a twisted one, we see that excuses are not binary but gradable: they can be weaker or stronger, mitigating blame to greater or lesser extent (Sliwa 2020). This paper argues that moral ignorance (due to forgetting) may well excuse but not exculpate — it may lessen the blameworthiness of a forgetting-involving wronging but not so much as to warrant forgiveness.
Abstract: Episodic memories are widely assumed to be factive: Saying that somebody remembers something presupposes that the ascribed mnemonic content is true and the descriptions used to express it have existing referents. In this respect the verb “remember” aligns with ordinary uses of perceptual verbs such as “see” and “hear””. The Causal Theory of Memory (Martin & Deutscher, 1966, Bernecker 2010) promises to explain the factivity of memory in two steps: (i) In the original perception a causal chain results in a categorial representation of the perceived object. (ii) The so obtained reference relation is passed on from the perception to the remembering event by a memory trace, which extends the causal link and transmits categorial representational content. Theories that deny the necessity of a content-preserving memory trace, such as Simulationism (Michaelian 2016) and Trace-Minimalism (Werning, 2020), prima facie, fare worse in explaining the reference relations of memories. However, this assessment changes when one also considers memories of non-veridical experiences such as dreams. Here causal links to their (counterfactual) intentional objects are typically not available. Still anaphoric reference relations between memory and dream content seem to hold. Even correctness conditions apply. It is possible to misremember what you have dreamt. In line with Blumberg (2018), we develop a parasitic account of the reference relations of mnemonic contents: Memories are referentially fully dependent on the original experiences, be they veridical or not. To establish this view, one only needs to single out the experience in question by an appropriate causal link to the remembering event. A transmission of categorial representational content is not necessary. The resulting view is in accordance with Trace-Minimalism.
Abstract: In this talk, I will argue for the view that episodic memory and sensory imagination are different types of propositional attitudes. First, I consider two plausible views about the content and attitude involved in remembering episodically. On one of those views, episodic remembering consists in taking a certain state of affairs that one perceived to be in the past. On the other view, remembering consists in taking a perception of that state of affairs to have caused the experience that one is currently having. Next, I offer a proposal about the content and attitude involved in imagining sensorily. Essentially, the proposal is that, when one imagines a state of affairs in virtue of having some mental image, one takes it to be possible that one could perceive that state of affairs, and that if one perceived it, one would have an experience which is phenomenologically similar to having the mental image that one is currently having. Finally, I highlight the differences which, on either of the two views about memory, separate memory from imagination, and conclude that memory and imagination are distinct propositional attitudes.
