José Carlos Camillo (Genève)
Singular thought and episodic memory

link: https://univ-grenoble-alpes-fr.zoom.us/j/92577529337?pwd=lQbbmekMORc9xFVirKd8oLRFbAEnZv.1
meeting ID: 925 7752 9337
password: 851429

Abstract: Singular thought (or reference) refers to the capacity to single out entities or events among others—that is, to capture their numerical identity. Philosophers typically explain this capacity either in conceptual terms or in perceptual ones (De Carvalho, 2016). For example, Strawson (1959) argued that distinguishing two identical objects requires spatiotemporal concepts, while perceptual accounts claim that singular content arises from automatic processes of object individuation in the visual system (Green & Quilty-Dunn, 2021). Yet, perceptual approaches struggle to explain how agents distinguish between two objects with identical properties or re-identify them over time. To address this, some have proposed an intermediate view: abstract object representations in the prefrontal cortex support perceptual processes, thereby enabling both individuation and (re-)identification (De Carvalho & Newen, 2019). So far, however, most philosophical accounts of singular thought have neglected empirical research on episodic memory. Evidence shows that the hippocampus organizes event representations through spatiotemporal coordinates and binds object properties to these coordinates (Yonelinas, 2013; Eichenbaum, 2017; Ekstrom & Yonelinas, 2020). This suggests that objects can be represented as clusters of properties individuated by their spatiotemporal coordinates—without requiring an explicit concept of space and time. In light of this, I argue that episodic memory contributes to singular thought by automatically assigning objects unique spatiotemporal coordinates. Moreover, because the hippocampal system integrates temporally distant coordinates, it enables the reidentification of objects across time. In this way, episodic memory provides a naturalistic basis for singular thought that avoids reliance on conceptual schemes and sidesteps the limitations of purely perceptual accounts.